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I2CREDIT Nº 41

Credit Where It's Not Due

Credit Where It's Not DueWhen the Senate Banking Committee holds its hearings today on regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, members should keep foremost in mind the determination by a December Federal Reserve study that the secondary mortgage giants provide little or no benefit to homebuyers, while costing taxpayers billions.

Por: Howard Husock, The Wall Street Journal
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This must now serve as the first argument for their eventual privatization. But it is not the only argument. Public support has not only enriched stockholders at taxpayer expense but has provided the rationale for a system of regulatory mandates which seek to use the vast mortgage capital pool as an instrument of unwise social policy. In the name of expanding home-ownership and assisting low-income and inner city households, these mandates risk undermining the crucial habits of thrift and frugality so important to upward mobility -- and replacing them with the fools' gold of easy credit.

Here's how the system works. In exchange for their status as "government-sponsored enterprises" -- and the credit market advantages which come from the perception that the government will not allow them to fail -- Fannie and Freddie are subject to so-called "affordable housing goals." These mortgage purchase quotas, set by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), require that no less than 50% of the mortgages purchased by Fannie and Freddie be for low and moderate-income households, that 20% be specifically for those of low income, and that 31% come from "geographically targeted underserved areas." These figures represent substantial increases adopted in the waning days of the Clinton administration.

What could be wrong with what seem to be laudable goals? A great deal. They are based in a big lie which a national coalition of anti-banking groups has circulated for years: that the private mortgage markets would, left to their own devices, deny credit to those of modest means in less than affluent neighborhoods -- a charge known as red-lining when it first surfaced in the 1970s.

The best that can be said for this is that there was a time, before the bank deregulation of the early '80s, when banks had little incentive to serve riskier markets and often did not. But that is ancient history in the mortgage industry -- which now uses computerized credit scoring, flexible interest rates and mortgage-backed securities to serve almost anyone. The advent of sub-prime -- read higher-interest -- lending has brought credit to higher-risk households once outside the mainstream financial system. They have helped push up the American rate of home-ownership to its record high of 68.4%. Indeed, between 1993 and 2001, 1.4 million Americans bought homes with sub-prime loans.

But the bank-haters -- including activist groups like ACORN, the Greenlining Institute, and National Community Reinvestment Coalition, whose collective raison d'etre lies in the supposed market failure of the mortgage lending industry -- don't see all this as an advance at all. With HUD oversight, they pressure Fannie and Freddie not to purchase sub-prime loans, which are denounced as "predatory."

They have pushed a wave of "anti-predatory" lending legislation through state legislatures, based in such vague criteria that rating agencies, fearful of potential liability, have said they can't rate the risk of mortgage bonds which include sub-prime loans. Were it not for the courageous decision by Comptroller of the Currency John Hawke to exempt nationally chartered banks from these state laws, sub-prime mortgage lending might well dry up. Mr. Hawke was undeterred by threats of lawsuits by Eliot Spitzer, and his Connecticut counterpart Richard Blumenthal.

The agenda here is a demand for credit on easy terms for areas and households which are, in the liberal imagination, uniformly victims of an unjust economic system -- rather than being seen as individuals, some of whom deserve credit on favorable terms, some of whom don't. With HUD pressure to meet the affordable housing goals, and high-interest loans castigated as predatory, both the banks -- which want to sell mortgages to Fannie and Freddie -- and the secondary giants themselves, which want to retain government support, have reason to let easy credit flow, willy-nilly, to target populations.

Therein lies the real danger of the affordable housing goals. They provide a powerful incentive to say yes to mortgage applications to which it might be better for lenders to say no. It is, after all, better to say no when a household has not saved a sufficient down payment or lacks a reliable income stream. "No," under such circumstances -- and said with an explanation -- is a way of saying, If you improve your creditworthiness, you can get a mortgage. Saying no is also a protection for those who already own homes in a neighborhood. Foreclosures -- the bitter fruit of easy credit -- are bad news for neighboring homeowners who are making their mortgage payments and hoping the value of their home will increase. This is the virtuous circle that arises from traditional credit criteria, and is threatened by "affordable housing goals."

That's been the story with another easy-credit mortgage program, that of the Federal Housing Administration, notable for their "flexible qualifying guidelines" designed to help low-income households. Down payments are 3% or less, with loans insured by the federal government. The delinquency rates for FHA loans runs over 12%, more than four times the 2.93% rate for prime rate loans. And problematic FHA loans have been shown to be concentrated in lower-income urban neighborhoods.

The Fed has found that higher-than-conventional foreclosure rates also typify so-called Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) "special lending programs" -- a geographically targeted program which banks adopt to fulfill the Act's lending mandates. Like the Fannie and Freddie affordable housing goals, the CRA is built on the false premise of an anti-poor conspiracy by the financial industry; and it allows non-profit mortgage lenders like the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America to gain the right to administer huge pools of mortgage money on behalf of fearful banks.

It's true that the delinquency rates for sub-prime mortgages are also high (11+%); but at least these loans hold the prospect of encouraging households to learn from their mistakes and qualify for better credit rates next time. The easy credit of the Fannie and Freddie affordable housing goals breaks the link between personal habits and creditworthiness. Public subsidy for Fannie and Freddie merely gives those who would pervert mortgage markets the chance to make credit seem like an entitlement.

Ultimas Notas

I2CREDIT Nº 41

Estructuración de un departamento de riesgos

Estructuración de un departamento de riesgosVarios son los aspectos que deben ser analizados por la alta dirección de una institución financiera cuando decide estructurar un departamento, área o unidad de control y gestión de riesgos.
Uno de ellos es el concerniente al nivel institucional en que operará. En las entidades que pertenecen a un grupo, se deberá decidir si la unidad de riesgos (o como se denomine) operará a escala corporativa o a escala de cada órgano de la corporación.

Por: Dr. Jorge Ambram Presidente ejecutivo Instituto Latinoamericano de Riesgos, S.A. Costa Rica.

Gestión de Riesgos en Mercados Emergentes

Gestión de Riesgos en Mercados EmergentesSi bien no existe un poder supranacional que exija a los mercados emergentes cumplir con los supuestos de administración de riesgos que se señalan en Basilea II, sus lineamientos obligan e incentivan a las autoridades de los países a ponerse en regla.

Por: Jorge Ambram - www.actualidad.co.cr

China: La reforma financiera en China

China: La reforma financiera en ChinaHoy China es tema obligado de todos los medios periodísticos técnicos y no técnicos. Su economía es responsable de gran parte del comercio mundial, y es destino de importantes inversiones locales y extranjeras aunque los analistas opinan que su comportamiento dependerá de la eficacia de las reformas necesarias para mantener un crecimiento estable.

Por: Martín Palladino Consultor Asociado, CMS España

Argentina: Los créditos bancarios al sector privado crecieron un 36% en el año

Argentina: Los créditos bancarios al sector privado crecieron un 36% en el añoSegún los datos del Banco Central, las líneas de crédito más dinámicas fueron los préstamos personales, con un aumento superior al 70% y el de tarjetas de crédito, con un alza del 59%.

Por: Publicado en www.infobae.com

Chile: Call y Contact Center - El gran valor de los clientes -

Chile: Call y Contact Center - El gran valor de los clientes -Los call y contact centers en Chile se han desarrollado significativamente. Existe una oferta cada vez más amplia de equipamiento, servicio y consultoría; todo para que las empresas puedan delegar en especialistas el contacto con sus clientes y la administración de su relación con ellos. A tanto ha llegado su especialización, que a nivel local ya se exportan servicios de call y contact center a países como Estados Unidos y España. Acerca de las ventajas para el negocio de los clientes, el desarrollo de este mercado en el país durante los últimos años y el valor agregado que aportan los call y contact centers al resultado final de la operación de las empresas, conversamos con destacados proveedores del área, en el desayuno organizado por Revista Gerencia.

Por: Publicado en www.emb.cl/gerencia

Notas Destacadas

2012
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 106
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 105
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 104
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 103
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 102
2011
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 101
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 100
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 99
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 98
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 97
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 96
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 95
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 94
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 93
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 92
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 91
2010
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 90
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 89
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 88
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 87
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 86
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 85
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 84
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 83
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 82
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 81
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 80
2009
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 79
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 78
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 77
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 76
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 75
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 74
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 73
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 72
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 71
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 70
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 69
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 68
2008
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 67
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 66
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 65
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 64
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 63
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 62
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 61
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 60
2007
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 59
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 58
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 57
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 56
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 55
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 54
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 53
2006
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 52
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 51
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 50
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 49
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 48
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 47
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 46
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 45
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 44
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 43
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 42
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 41
2005
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 40
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 39
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 38
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 37
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 36
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 35
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 34
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 33
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 32
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 31
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 30
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 29
2004
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 28
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 27
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 26
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 25
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 24
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 23
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 22
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 21
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 20
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 19
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 18
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 17
2003
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 16
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 15
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 14
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 13
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 12
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 11
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 10
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 9
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 8
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 7
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 6
2002
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 5
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 4
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 3
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 2
CREDIT PERFORMANCE Nº 1

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